Terrorism: NAS Urges Gov't to Work with Scientists

By ACSH Staff — Oct 30, 2003
October marks the two-year anniversary of the anthrax attacks that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Two years ago, some Americans realized for the first time the amount of animosity felt in some places toward the United States. What have we done since then to prevent such incidents and prepare for the future? President Bush embarked on his "war on terrorism," airlines have increased security, and now the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has released a report suggesting that the U.S.

October marks the two-year anniversary of the anthrax attacks that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Two years ago, some Americans realized for the first time the amount of animosity felt in some places toward the United States. What have we done since then to prevent such incidents and prepare for the future? President Bush embarked on his "war on terrorism," airlines have increased security, and now the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has released a report suggesting that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services set up an advisory board to oversee biological research.

gen_terrorism2003 Scientific knowledge and technological achievements are advancing at a rapid pace, helping us better treat, prevent, and sometimes cure various illnesses. However, the NAS report reminds us that we live in an age in which biological advancements can be used to harm society as well.

The Academy suggests that a board be created to evaluate experiments before they are conducted, to analyze whether or not there is the potential for particular research to be used by "hostile nations" or terrorists to attack the U.S. According to their report, because the U.S. is involved in advanced biotechnology research that is continuously being published, knowledge of the techniques and how to misuse them is readily available to anyone who chooses to look for it. While it's easy to think of ways that studies could be misused, the Academy focused on technologies with the greatest potential for sinister applications, including studies on how to make certain human or animal vaccines ineffective, how to confer antibiotic resistance (and resistance to antiviral agents) upon microorganisms, and how to enhance the virulence of different pathogens or increase their transmissibility.

An obvious objection to such a committee is that preventing the pursuit of scientific knowledge or preventing results from being published might stifle creativity and progress, perhaps even lessen our ability to treat people with the therapies that might result. To address this concern, the Academy suggests a "self-governing" approach to inquiries, utilizing a committee of scientists, scientific journal publishers and editors, and national security experts to advise already-existing scientific review boards on incorporating bioterrorism concerns into their project management decisions.

The report suggests expanding the duties of the National Institute of Health's Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC), which was originally established to review research involving genetic testing and manipulation, to include the evaluation of projects' national security implications. The report also advises expanding RAC's jurisdiction, currently limited to federally-funded projects, to include private research. Because the U.S. isn't the only nation conducting research, the Academy advises working with other nations to define international guidelines for research and international regulations for possession of various pathogens and reagents.

It is valuable to know that measures are being taken to protect Americans from terrorist attacks. However, we shouldn't rely solely on the government to prevent every terror scenario. The war on terror may capture some terrorists, but it may also stimulate more hostility towards the U.S., and we can't be certain of stopping all of them. Though steps have been taken to increase airport security, just this month a college student was able to sneak box cutters and bleach past security at a major airline. Similarly, even if NAS is able to accomplish some gains in limiting the scope or public availability of sensitive studies and thus spur better oversight of pathogens used in research it doesn't take much to wage an attack. The anthrax mail attacks and other bioweapon attacks worldwide have usually not relied on highly technical knowledge, only access to chemicals and pathogens. We should keep ourselves informed, know the real risks we may face, and know what to do if the worst occurs. We should neither be complacent in the belief that the government will handle everything, nor become panicked and overzealous in an attempt to prevent every hypothetical disaster.

See ACSH's A Citizen's Guide to Terrorism and Response: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear for more information, including recommendations on how to protect yourself in case of a bioterrorist attack.